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After the Asian currency crisis, most Asian economies have adopted managed float regimes, with notable 
exception of China, Hong Kong, and Malaysia. Various studies have examined the weights of the dollar, 
the yen, and the euro, regarding floating is loosely managed with reference to the basket currency system. 
However, results are mixed, in that in some periods, the yen weight seems to be higher in some countries, 
and in some other periods, the Asian currencies seem to have gone back to the dollar peg. This paper seeks 
the determinants of the yen weight in Asian currencies. It is found that the yen weight tends to increase 
when the yen depreciates and when the domestic interest rates rise. The yen weight tends to decrease 
when the US interest rate rises. Asymmetry is observed among coefficients of variables between the lower 
and higher yen periods. In addition, the yen weight is less susceptible to the overall position of the US 
dollar vis-à-vis major currencies. It should also be noted that the peculiarity among countries seems large 
in handling the currency weights in the basket. 
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1. Introduction 
After the Asian currency crisis, most Asian countries have adopted managed float regimes. Various 
studies have examined the weights of the dollar, the yen, and the euro, regarding floating is loosely 
managed with reference to the basket currency system. However, results are mixed, in that in some 
periods, the yen weight seems to be higher in some countries, and in some other periods, the Asian 
currencies seem to have gone back to the dollar peg. This paper identifies the determinants of the yen 
weight in Asian currencies. It is found that the yen weight tends to increase when the yen depreciates to 
decrease when the US interest rate rises. 
The basket currency regime has been proposed as a desirable system for East Asian countries that have 
diversified trade structure. Stabilizing the real effective exchange rate, as opposed to the nominal bilateral 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar, makes more sense from minimizing short-run fluctuation in trade 
accounts, avoiding sustained exchange rate misalignment and loss of competitiveness, and uninviting 
speculative capital inflows and its sudden reversal. 
What would be an institutional framework that would ensure that the exchange rate would be 
stabilized against the real effective exchange rate? If the country can find and adopt a system that the 
actual exchange rate moves in line with the real effective exchange rate automatically, that would be 
desirable. One obvious candidate is that each country calculates their approximate real effective exchange 
rate movements and engineers the exchange rate toward that rate (by monetary policy, fiscal policy and 
interventions). They may adopt similar but different basket systems. However, the real effective exchange 
rate of Country A includes neighboring countries exchange rates. The choice of the exchange rate regimes 
of neighboring countries affects how the exchange rate would move for Country A. If a neighboring 
country is adopting a dollar peg (wrongly), then Country A is more likely to adopt the dollar peg, and they 
collectively move to a dollar peg. If neighboring countries adopt a basket system, then Country A has 
more incentive to adopt the basket system. The difficulty of finding a collectively optimal basket weight 
when there is interdependence of the dollar weight in the currency baskets of neighboring countries was 
first pointed out by Ogawa and Ito (2000). 
The dollar and yen weights in the baskets of East Asian countries have changed over time since the de 
facto dollar peg was abandoned in 1997. In 1998, the correlation of some of the East Asian currencies 
with the Japanese yen rose, suggesting that the weight of the yen became high in those countries. 
However, the East Asian currencies seemed to move more with the US dollar in 1999-2002, suggesting 
that the yen weight was lowered. In 2003-2004, movements of the East Asian currencies vary from one to 
another. Singaporean dollar, Korean won and Thai baths movements suggest that they are on the more 
genuine basket system, while others tend to stabilize their currencies against the US dollar in nominal 
terms. This paper will describe how the yen weight among the East Asian currencies has changed since the 
Asian currency crisis and examine determinants of the yen weight across countries. 
Our paper consists of the following four parts. Section 2 is devoted to the literature survey. Section 3 
describes and examines the actual currency changes after the Asian currency crisis, by calculating the 
weights of the dollar, the yen and the euro in explaining the Asian currency fluctuations. Section 4 
attempts to identify determinants of the yen weights in these basket economies. Major macro economic 
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indicators are tested for possible determinants. Section 5 extends this benchmark regression in order to 
explore whether the yen weights were different in the appreciation and depreciation stages of the yen 
vis-à-vis the dollar, and in the appreciation and depreciation stages of the dollar (against the euro as well 
as the yen). Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Changing Views on the Optimal Exchange Rate Regime 
Since the beginning of the Asian crisis, the economists’ views on the appropriate exchange rate regime 
for emerging market economies have changed from one extreme to another. When the Thai baht was 
devalued on July 2, 1997, it has quickly become a consensus that the de facto dollar peg, combined with 
an open capital account, is a dangerous option. Many recommended emerging market economies to adopt 
the flexible exchange rate. Indeed, Asian countries moved to flexible exchange rate (floating or widening 
the band) soon after the baht was floated. However, flexible exchange rate is no defense against large 
capital outflows, since large depreciation of the currency imposes hardship on the financial institutions as 
well as corporations. The damaged balance sheet of banks put the whole financial system at risk. 
A lesson was learnt that when the balance sheets of banks were already heavily dollar denominated, 
keeping the exchange rate peg at any cost might be another option. A resolve of keeping the interest high, 
even with harsh contractionary effects, in order to defend the peg may deter speculative attack. One such 
institution would be the currency board—automatic adjustment of domestic monetary base as capital 
flow comes in or out, and no open market operation of domestic bonds. The fact that Hong Kong (in the 
Asian crisis) and Argentina (in the Mexican crisis earlier) had survived the contagion effects had also given 
credibility to this view. 
How to reconcile the two views, desirability of the flexible exchange rate and the dollar hard peg? 
Maybe the two extremes are safe, but not the middle ground—the bipolar view. Fischer (2001) most 
eloquently put forward this view. Emerging markets were recommended to adopt either the hard peg or 
completely free-floating exchange rate. However, there were only a few takers of this advice among 
emerging market economies. Opposing views were also expressed as an intermediate option: a basket, 
band, and crawl arrangement, such as Williamson (2000), Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki (1998), Ohno (1999), 
and Ogawa and Ito (2002). The bipolar view lost a steam when Argentina’s peg was broken in a chaotic 
economic crisis at the end of 2002. 
Once the worst of the crisis was over, sometime between late 1998 and mid-1999, many East Asian 
countries have implicitly pursued a basket system, except the three dollar-peg countries:  China, Hong 
Kong, and Malaysia (after September 1, 1998). However, once the economies have recovered from the 
trough, flexibilities of the exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar seem to have lost. Several countries, that 
were said to have adopted the flexible exchange rate regime, seemed to have moved back to a loose peg to 
the US dollar (see McKinnon (2000) and Ogawa (2002)).  Similarly, there was strong movement toward 
stability of the exchange rate in terms of the US dollar among Latin American countries. 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) pioneered the study of de facto exchange rate regime, as opposed to the 
legally-professed regime, or de jure regime. They found that many countries de facto pursued quasi-fixed 
exchange rate system without declaring it. This is called as “fear of floating.” The taxonomy of the de 
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facto exchange rate regime has further been developed by other researchers like Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2002), and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002). 
Williamson (1999), and Ogawa and Ito (2000) proposed that the East Asian countries should adopt a 
common, or at least, coordinated, currency basket. Ogawa and Kawasaki (2003) suggested the possibility 
of forming parallel basket groups in the take-off period prior to a unified basket in Asia. Ogawa and 
Shimizu (2006) proposed a pragmatic way of measuring deviations of each participant currency from the 
central rate in a virtual basket, using the weighted averages of trade weights and GDP sizes. 
When the actual basket currency arrangement of East Asian countries is examined, there are several 
difficulties. First, many countries have adopted the basket without explicitly admitting it.  Therefore, 
any behavior of the exchange rate is in a sense de facto rather than de jure. Second, even without explicit 
policy responses (monetary policy or intervention), the exchange rate may behave as if it is on the basket 
system by policy choice, because the market may move the exchange rate in the direction that would be 
consistent with the explicit basket system. In that sense, the exchange rate that behaves like the basket 
system may be market-driven basket system. Combining these two characters, we call the situation as the 
implicit basket system in East Asia. 
Frankel and Wei (1993, 94), who developed a method of measuring weights of basket, negatively 
concluded to a question whether the yen has increased its weight in the Asian implicit basket system. 
Bénassy-Quéré (1999) applied that into the analysis in the developed countries, and Shimizu (2003) found 
that implicit basket system seemed to have been resurrected in several countries. 
All of these studies combined suggest that since the basket system is implicit, the yen weight varies 
from a country to another, and from a year to another for the same country. It is our objective why some 
countries have put more weight on the yen than other countries, or why a country put more weight on the 
yen in a particular period than other periods. First, the history of the yen weight in major East Asian 
countries will be reviewed. The yen weight in the implicit basket was typically high in 1998-1999. However, 
at the same time that Asian countries resumed high growth and the euro firmly established itself in the 
international currency market, that is, in 2000-2001, a trend toward re-adopting the dollar peg à la 
McKinnon emerged. However, the yen weight increased somewhat in 2003-2004. Second, it will be 
attempted to identify determinants of the yen weight in the implicit basket system. Third, a particular 
hypothesis is examined, namely, whether the yen weight varied in the appreciation and depreciation 
stages of the yen vis-à-vis the US dollar. This hypothesis is similar to what Ogawa (2004) was interested in, 
namely there were asymmetric responses to the US dollar depreciation among East Asian currencies. We 
believe our analysis is relevant because it contributes to draw implications for designing a stable currency 
basket system in EA. 
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3. Estimating the implicit currency weights 
3.1 Analytical method 
The general way of computing implicit basket weights can be expressed as the following way: 
t i k h
n
h
h t k i e e , 1 , /
1
0 , / ǭ Ӡ ǩ ǩ Ӡ     ¦
                      ( 1 )  
where e is the logarithm of nominal exchange rate, i is the name of currency, k is the numeraire 
currency, n is the number of implicitly weighted currencies,  ǩhs are the implicit basket weights, and  ǭ
refers to disturbance. 
Various options for the numeraire currency have been attempted in the literature. As reviewed in 
Bénassy-Quéré and Coeuré (2003), the Swiss franc, the pound sterling, the Australian dollar, a basket of 
currencies including Special Drawing Rights or a basket of Group of Seven currencies have been among 
popular options. We chose the Swiss franc as a traditional and the most popular option. Decomposing the 
currency into a weighted average of other currencies is another step. Shimizu (2003) selected four 
currencies in decomposing fluctuations of East Asian currencies: the US dollar, the yen, the deutsche 
mark, and the pound sterling. Since we hope to focus on the latest period, the dollar, the yen, and the euro 
are chosen below, with the euro is backwardly calculated by the formula for years before January 1999. 
Therefore, the general expression of (1) is rewritten as follows: 
t i t CHF euro t CHF CHF dollar t CHF i e e e e , , / 3 , / 2 1 , / 1 0 , / ǭ Ӡ ǩ Ӡ ǩ Ӡ ǩ ǩ Ӡ 㩯             ( 2 )  
Nine economies are examined in our first-stage analysis: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. The sample period covers a decade from 
January 1995 to December 2004. Euro data before 1999 were computed by applying the euro conversion 
data at the end of 1998.1 The exchange rates are those of closing rate of New York, taken from the 
Datastream. 
3.2 Implicit basket weights 
The three currency weights are calculated from the daily data for three-month periods.    Table 1 shows 
the results. In case of a rigid dollar peg, the weight of the dollar becomes a unity and the weights of other 
currencies zero, with high adjusted R-squared scores. The dollar peg is confirmed for the following four 
economies: China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Taiwan. The Chinese RMB was officially depreciated in 
1994, and then pegged to the US dollar. Hong Kong, sticking to its currency board system, sustained a 
dollar peg. Malaysia, after experiencing flexible exchange rate system for more than a year, re-pegged the 
Ringgit to the US dollar, at US$1 = Ringgit3.8 in September 1998. Taiwan changed its fluctuating range 
from NT$26-28 per US dollar in the pre-crisis period to NT$3-35 per US dollar in the post-crisis period. 
However, the range was stable enough that the econometric examination produced that it cannot be 
                                                     
1 The euro conversion rates are as follows: 1 euro = ATS13.7603 (Austria), BEF40.3399 (Belgium), FIM5.94573 (Finland), FRF6.55957 (France), 
DEM1.95583 (Germany), GRD340.750 (Greece), IEP0.787564 (Ireland), ITL1936.27 (Italy), LUF40.3399 (Luxemburg), NLG2.20371 (the 
Netherlands), ESP166.386 (Spain), and PTE200.486 (Portugal).
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indistinguishable from a dollar peg. 
The remained five countries demonstrate some signs of managing a basket currency regime, namely a 
reasonably large yen weight that is statistically significantly different from zero. The yen and euro weights 
in the Singaporean basket show steady movement. The yen weight in the Singaporean basket has 
fluctuated between 20 and 30 percent in the last three years. The Korean and Thai baskets also show 
significant weights on the yen and euro, although the non-dollar weights fluctuated widely in the last 
three years. The Indonesian and the Philippine baskets demonstrate less and varying weights on the yen.2
Indonesia suffered most by the financial crisis in terms of currency depreciation and recession among the 
East Asian countries. The inflation rate also rose sharply in Indonesia, and inflation and deprecation 
reinforced each other in 1998-99. The Indonesian rupiah fluctuated widely, and so did weights of the dollar, 
the yen, and the euro. There are several periods in which the weight of the yen or the euro is off the scale 
(more than 2 or minus), and that is not the confirmation of any weights on the non-dollar currencies. 
The Philippine peso also depreciated vis-à-vis the US dollar during the currency crisis but less so than 
Thai baht, Korean won, or Indonesian rupiah. However, the Philippine peso continued to decline unlike 
other Asian currencies. The weights of the yen and the euro occasionally show a coefficient to be 
significantly zero. The Philippine case is somewhere between Indonesia and the full dollar peg. 
Our findings are summarized as follows: First, re-intensifying a dollar peg, as argued by McKinnon for 
the period of 1999-2001, was not sustained except for China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Malaysia. Second, 
the least stable and most interrupted basket management is observed in Indonesia. Third, attempts of 
basket management seemed to have been intensified in Korea, Singapore, and Thailand. Especially, after 
the launch of euro at the beginning of 2001, the implicit basket system has stabilized in terms of their yen 
weights.
4. Determinants of the yen weight 
4.1 Setup of model 
We now proceed to examine if fluctuations in the yen weight observed in these economies reflect any 
economic fundamentals. The outcome of the last section suggests that we focus on the three countries: 
Korea, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Determinants of yen weights are set as dependent variable. They are re-computed monthly by rolling 
regressions for the respective preceding three-month period by using the same database. The sample 
period is from the beginning of 1999 to December of 2004, because a chaotic period following the Asian 
currency crisis had been over by the end of 1998. 
Figure 1 shows ups-and-downs of the yen weight in these three countries. A point estimate with a one 
standard deviation band is shown.   
In the regression, we attempt to explain the fluctuation of the yen weight by some pre-determined 
variables, including (i) the yen/dollar exchange rate level (e); (ii) the change in the yen/dollar exchange rate 
                                                     
2 During the period of Jan.2002 to Dec.2004, the number of quarters with the significant yen weight was 7 for Korea (3 at the 99% level, 3 at the 95 level, 
and 1 at the 90% level), 11 for Singapore (11, 0, 0), and 11 for Thailand (8, 2, 1). They exceeded 4 for Indonesia (1,1,2) and 5 for the Philippines (0,5,0) in 
total number of quarters and the degree of significance.
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(Ӡe); (iii) changes in CPI (ӠCPI) of the country in question is higher; (iv) changes in industrial 
production (ӠIP); (v) changes in exports in US dollar (ӠEXPORTS); (vi) a change in the local 
short-term rates (ӠLOCALINT); and (vii) a change in the US short-term interest rates (ӠUSINT). We 
suspect that some Asian countries tended to increase the yen weight when the yen was depreciating, and 
decrease the yen weight when the yen was appreciating, so that their export competitiveness can be 
maintained. 
We also expect that the yen weight will increase when the changes in CPI of the country in question are 
higher, and when industrial production of the country in question is also higher. An increased yen weight 
will be accepted as well when exports of the country increase. The prediction is based on a hypothesis that 
the country will tolerate an appreciation of their currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar when the domestic 
economy is favorable. 
In addition, impacts of the interest rate changes are examined. An increase in local short-term rates is 
expected to increase the yen weight by anticipating larger financial inflows which will boost domestic 
economies. On the contrary, a rise in the US short-term interest rates will force them to reduce the yen 
weight for the purpose of offsetting negative impact caused by increased capital outflows.3
The first-type regression here by the ordinary least squares is expressed as follows: 
t i t i t i t i
t i t i t t t i
USINT LOCALINT EXPORTS
IP CPI e e W
, , 7 , 6 , 5
, 4 , 3 $, / 2 $, / 1 0 ,
H E E E
E E E E E
   
     
Ӡ Ӡ Ӡ
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        ( 3 )   
where W stands for yen weight. 
Monthly data of variables in (i) to (vii) are taken from IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
CD-ROM (August 2005). Three types of pooled regressions, with or without a fixed effect, will be 
attempted: one including contemporaneous explanatory variables (t), and the rest with lagged variables 
of one (t-1) and two periods (t-2), respectively. Simultaneously, we apply an OLS regression on the 
country-by-country basis for the three economies in question (“local” regression, hereafter). 
4.2 Regression results 
The regression results are shown in Table 2. Major findings are as follows: First, both coefficients of e 
and Ӡe are significant in the contemporaneous regression (including et and Ӡet). Expected signs are 
confirmed: marginal depreciation in yen rates vis-à-vis the dollar leads to higher yen weights in the 
implicit basket. When the lagged values are used in the regression, the coefficient of Ӡe remains 
significant in the regression with the lagged variables, while the coefficient of e fails to be significant in the 
regression with the lagged variables. 
<Table 2 about here> 
Changes in the inflations rates (ӠCPI), industrial production (ӠIP), and export amount (Ӡ
EXPORTS) are found to be insignificant in any regression. 
Among short-term interest variables, changes in the US short-term interest rate (ӠUSINT) are found 
                                                     
3 The data 60B. in the IFS are applied: money market rate for Korea and Thailand, three-month interbank rate for Singapore, and the Federal Funds rate 
for the US.
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to be significantly affecting the yen weight. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level in the 
three regressions with no fixed effects. The yen weight decreased as the US short-term interest rate rose. 
Meanwhile, local short-term interest rates (ӠLOCALINT) did not influence, to a significant degree, the 
option in operating the currency weight. 
Let us examine the above findings in the “local” regressions more closely. OLS regressions are applied 
for respective three countries. The results are shown in Table 3. 
Singapore provides us with three significant variables: e, ӠLOCALINT, and ӠUSINT with the 
expected signs, while  Ӡe failed to be significant.  ӠCPI,  ӠIP, and  ӠEXPORTS were not significant in 
these country-specific regressions as well. In Thailand, higher significance was found in  Ӡe than in e with 
the expected signs, while short-term interest rates, both domestic and the US (ӠLOCALINT and Ӡ
USINT), were not significant. In Korea, no more than two variables were significant in the 
contemporaneous regression, while expected signs are generally confirmed. 
In these three countries, degree of influence varies among these regressors. The yen level (e) affects the 
yen weight with the highest degree in Singapore, while the change in yen-dollar rates (Ӡe) are most 
influential in Thailand. The CPI Inflation rate (ӠCPI) is potent in Thailand, while changes in the 
domestic and the US interest rates (ӠLOCALINT and  ӠUSINT) are most influential in Singapore. 
In short, changes in yen-dollar rates (Ӡe) and the US short-term interest rates (ӠUSINT) are, thus, 
generally significant followed by the yen-dollar rate levels (e). However, peculiarity among these three 
countries is large enough to shift significant variables and their degree of influence. 
5. Consistency under appreciated yen and depreciated dollar 
5.1 Appreciated yen case 
This section explores if the responses of the yen weight to a yen appreciation and to a yen depreciation 
are symmetrical. In order to answer this question, two sets of dummy variables are introduced to the 
fundamental regression executed in the last section. 
The first set of dummy variables is to differentiate yen appreciation and depreciation at a threshold of 
¥115/dollar.4 If the exchange rate is above this threshold, a lower yen dummy enters as the unity, and 
otherwise, zero, and if the exchange rate is below this threshold, a high yen dummy enters as the unity, 
and otherwise, zero.5 The second set of dummy variables concern the spread from the past two-year 
moving averages of the yen levels.6  If the current rate of the yen/dollar rate is above (below) the moving 
average, a lower (higher, resp.) yen dummy enters as one, and otherwise, zero. These dummies enter as 
coefficient dummies. In the regression extended in this section, changes in the yen-dollar rates (Ӡe) are 
used, but not the level of the yen, since the previous section proved the level of the yen was insignificant in 
general. 
As in the previous section, three types of regressions will be attempted: one contemporaneous 
regression (t), and two lagged ones with (t-1) and (t-2) explanatory variables. A pooled estimation and a 
                                                     
4 The average rate during the examined period (Jan.1999 to Dec.2004) is ¥115.45 to the dollar.
5 Of the total number of observations, 66, lower yen periods add up to 39, compared with 33 higher yen months.
6 Lower yen periods (19) is outnumbered by higher yen ones (51). This sample period is biased for yen’s appreciation on the moving average basis.
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country-specific regression (“local” regression) will simultaneously be executed as well. 
The results are tabulated in Tables 4 and 5. In Type 1 dummy case (Table 4), changes in the yen rate 
vis-à-vis the dollar (Ӡe) are significant in the lower yen periods at the 5 per cent significance level with the 
one-period lag. Significance is generally higher in the yen’s appreciated periods: Ӡe stays significant 
throughout the regressions at least at the 10 percent significance level. However, in the non-pooled “local” 
regressions, significant  Ӡe in higher yen periods can be observed nowhere than in Singapore. Coefficients 
are positive as expected. A depreciation in the yen-dollar rates will raise the yen weight in the basket in 
Singapore. However, in the other two countries, Ӡe failed to be significant in higher yen stages. In 
Thailand, significant  Ӡe can be observed in lower yen periods, while not in higher ones. In addition, there 
is no significant  Ӡe in Korea in both higher and lower yen stages. 
In Type 2 dummy case (Table 5), on the other hand, significance in Ӡe decreases to some extent. 
Higher significance recorded in Type 1 dummy case disappears, while remaining significant in lower yen 
periods. This is the case for the “local” regressions: We can no more detect significance in  Ӡe in higher yen 
periods for any country. 
ӠCPI is found partially significant in Type 1 dummy case, while expected signs are not assured in 
higher yen periods. Among the three countries, Thailand is the most sensitive to ӠCPI in lower yen 
periods. Higher significance cannot, if any, be observed in  ӠIP and  ӠEXPORTS. 
ӠUSINT is highly significant in pooled estimations with both Type 1 and 2 dummies. Signs are as 
expected: the yen weight decreased as the US short-term interest rate rose. Examining country by 
country in the “local” regressions, both  ӠLOCALINT and  ӠUSINT are highly significant in Singapore 
at the 1 per cent significance level in lower yen stages, while not in higher yen stages. In Korea, high degree 
of significance in  ӠUSINT is observed in higher yen periods in Type 2 case. 
Overall, asymmetric reactions are found between the lower and higher yen stages. Changes in the 
yen-dollar rates (Ӡe), CPI (ӠCPI), industrial production(ӠIP), and short-term domestic and US interest 
rates (ӠLOCALINT and  ӠUSINT) play important roles. Altering threshold in dummy definition, from 
Type 1 to Type 2 dummy, provides a different set of significant variables. However, asymmetry between 
the lower and higher yen-dollar stages does not disappear.  Ӡe, ӠLOCALINT, and  ӠUSINT generally 
remain significant with the signs unchanged. In short, asymmetry cannot be denied by modifying 
thresholds of dummies. 
5.2 Depreciated dollar case 
Another extension is attempted on the basic regression in order to differentiate the dollar depreciation 
vis-à-vis the yen (yen appreciation) and the dollar depreciation vis-à-vis both the yen and the euro. The 
dollar depreciation may mean different impacts on the Asian economies, if it is only against the yen or it is 
against both the yen and the euro. Effects of the dollar depreciation (against both the yen and the euro) 
on the yen weight are explored. Weaker dollar dummies, which are defined as being depreciated vis-à-vis 
both the yen and euro, enter into the regression as coefficient dummy.7 We again employ three-month 
                                                     
7 The number of weaker dollar periods is 26 in the 72 total observations.
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moving average of the dollar rate each period. As in the above analysis, a pooled estimation and 
country-by-country OLS regressions (“local” regressions) are simultaneously executed. 
Regression results are shown in Table 6. In the pooled estimation, Ӡe and ӠUSINT are significant 
regardless of the dollar rates. However, few of the other variables can join as significant in weaker dollar 
periods, except for  ӠCPI in the contemporaneous regression. Most variables realize expected signs, if not 
significant. When the dollar is low across the board, a rise in the yen weight will be contained even if the 
yen is being depreciated vis-à-vis the US dollar. This is the case for the change in US short-term interest 
rates (ӠUSINT): when the dollar is bearish, a rise in the US interest rates will further reduce the yen 
weight.
These findings are, for the most part, confirmed in the three “local” regressions. Unlike in the higher 
yen periods, overall bearish dollar stages do not profoundly affect decision in controlling yen weights in the 
basket system. 
However, Korea offers idiosyncratic information: when the dollar falls substantially, Korea decides to 
contain a rise in the yen weight even if the yen is being depreciated against the dollar. Compared to 
Singapore and Thailand, the degree of curtailing the yen weight’s rise is distinguished in Korea. Of these 
three countries allegedly adopting the implicit basket system, Korea is labeled the most sensitive to the US 
dollar level in adjusting the yen weight. On the contrary, Singapore and Thailand barely modify currency 
weights in the basket. 
Overall, subsections 5.1 and 5.2 provides an intriguing contrast: the yen depreciation and appreciation 
vis-à-vis the US dollar causes asymmetric effect in managing the yen weight in the basket, while the dollar 
depreciation vis-à-vis both the yen and the dollar results in marginal influence. The bottom line is that, in 
these countries except for Korea, the yen weight is more susceptible to the yen-dollar rate than the dollar 
rate vis-à-vis other major currencies. 
6. Conclusions 
We have examined the implicit basket systems of the three East Asian countries from 1999 to 2004. 
McKinnon (1999) argued that the yen weight in these implicit baskets was higher in 1997-1998, but the 
dollar peg returned after the summer of 1998. We argue that this is not necessarily the case as the data are 
extended to 2004. Countries like Korea, Singapore, and Thailand had resumed some kind of an implicit 
basket system. This is especially so after 2002, as the yen weights have become significant and stable. 
We then attempted to identify determinants of the yen weight in the implicit basket system. Three 
countries with relatively more stable basket management are chosen for our analysis. Among candidates, 
both level and change in yen-to-dollar rates were found to be significant in addition to the US short-term 
interest rate. Peculiarity among countries cannot also be overlooked. 
The basic regression was extended to explore if symmetry or asymmetry prevails in policy responses 
throughout lower-yen and higher-yen stages. In general, asymmetry was confirmed: the yen weight was 
highly sensitive to fluctuations in the yen-dollar rates and the US short-term interest rate in higher yen 
stages, while not in yen’s depreciation phases. In addition, the yen weight was found, in general, less 
susceptible to the US dollar rate levels vis-à-vis world major currencies than to the yen-dollar rate levels. 
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We commonly assume that the yen weight of the basket is stable, irrespective of changes of the 
yen-dollar rate or the dollar rate vis-à-vis the yen and the euro. However, the asymmetry we have 
obtained put a question on the widely-used specification of the basket system. The usual regression 
becomes unreliable, if the asymmetry is large and significant. 
However, there remain research topics for the future. Results in our analysis have an important 
implication for the usual regression to determine the currency weights, à la Frankel and Wei (1993). 
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